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A response to the demand of employers for control of health care costs, managed care has had a powerful
impact on American medicine. It has imposed cost-consciousness on physicians. It has forced hospitals to cut
back on the excess capacity that had grown unchecked over the years. And it has limited the health care choices
that insured Americans once had. 
In all, managed care has introduced a measure of market discipline into the practice of medicine that was
conspicuously absent in the regime of comparatively open-ended health insurance it replaced. When it comes
to health care, market discipline is surely crude and imperfect. But prospects for controlling once runaway
health care costs are brighter than they have been in a long time.
Managed care has also transformed the American health insurance market. Almost 30 percent of Americans
who were insured in 1997 were covered by health maintenance organizations (HMOs), as compared with just
under 20 percent as recently as 1992 (Employee Benefits Research Institute 1998). The percentage is bound to
continue to rise in coming years as governments goad Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries (who thus far have
remained almost entirely in fee-for-service medicine)into managed care in order to match the savings that
employers have already achieved. Another 40 percent of insured Americans are covered under "preferred
provider organization" (PPO) plans, which require subscribers to use physicians who have agreed to provide
health care at discounted rates (Employee Benefits Research Institute 1998).
The shift to managed care has also had profound impact on the economy at large. Almost half of the decline in
the GDP deflator's rate of increase during the 1990s (from 4.2 percent in 1989 to 2.0 percent in 1997) can be
ascribed to the deceleration in the price of health care.1 With health care now almost 15 percent of GDP, and
thus rivaling manufacturing in size in the economy at large, a decline in inflation of that magnitude would have
been hard, if not impossible, to achieve without a major break in the price of health care.
Cost-conscious medicine also paved the way for the emerging federal budgetary surplus--no surprise
considering that Medicare and Medicaid account for as much as one-fifth of the budget. As the post-World
War II baby boom ages, health care's share of GDP is apt to increase once again. But, for now, it seem to have
stabilized after decades of seemingly relentless rise.
Virtually all U.S. health care is managed in some ways. Even the least restrictive fee-for-service plan now
requires subscribers to follow some utilization review procedures to be reimbursed for all but minor expenses.
As used here, however, the term managed care refers only to health care that is (a) prepaid and (b) provided by
physicians who are governed by clinical practice guidelines--neither of which applies in a PPO or in a
fee-for-service plan even with the many managed care features both of these insurance types have taken on.
The term is thus used interchangeably with HMO medicine. The HMO links the financing and the delivery of
health care; it is both "provider" and insurer, in contrast to the old fee-for-service model in which these were
separate and distinct.
Growing national debate Successful as managed care has been in curbing health care costs, it has been much less so in winning public
support. Public disquietude has grown as anecdotes of denials of needed care have multiplied in the media: a
child with an appendix about to rupture sent to a distant emergency room because that is where the HMO's
discount was the largest; women sent home prematurely from a hospital after giving birth; commonplace
diagnostic tools denied to patients with tumors that later metastasized.
Care givers also have become increasingly skeptical, judging by the statement of two thousand Massachusetts
doctors and nurses published in the Journal of the American Medical Association  (Dec. 3, 1997):
"Physicians and nurses are being prodded by threats and bribes to abdicate allegiance to patients, and to shun
the sickest, who may be unprofitable. Some of us risk being fired or 'delisted' for giving, or even discussing,
expensive services, and many are offered bonuses for minimizing care." The nation has fashioned, one
physician concludes, a health care system that costs a trillion dollars a year but cannot "afford the luxury of a
conscience or a heart" (Glasser 1998). 
On the one side of the debate about the merits of managed care are those who, like the Massachusetts doctors
and nurses, argue that cost-control has come at an unacceptably high price. Economies, they claim, will have
far-reaching consequences on health outcomes long into the future, and even now are all too real for vulnerable
groups: those with chronic illnesses, the elderly, and the poor (Miller and Luft 1997). Something is perverse,
they maintain, in a payments system that makes well-intentioned physicians look on patients as a drain on their
income (Rodwin 1993).
Apologists for managed care cite the benefits of its emphasis on preventive care and of its having cut out
marginally beneficial (and sometimes even harmful uneconomic)care. Outcomes data for the vast majority of
Americans, they contend, fail to indict managed care as inferior to the more expensive, often wasteful,
fee-for-service medicine of the past. The economies managed care has brought about, they maintain, do not
raise life and death issues. As they see it, the issues are an extra day in the hospital, a visit to a specialist, an
expensive drug--and only when the stakes are low and confidence in the diagnosis high (Hall 1997).
This paper joins in the debate. It examines the features of HMOs and their associated ethical problems. And it
points to a framework of needed consumer protection. The problems seem to flow from the very design of
HMO medicine. One is prepayment. Every revenue dollar is also potentially a profit dollar when not spent on
direct patient care--a temptation, if not also an incentive, not only to economize on care but to skimp on it.
Another problem is the oversight of physician practice by nonphysicians. That may yield significant savings,
but it also threatens physician autonomy and, more important, physician capacity to act as patient advocate. 
The public policy concern is with how HMO medicine addresses the trade-offs between quality and cost and
with the ethical issues those trade-offs raise. In particular, it is about the change in the role of physician from
agent of the patient to agent of the health plan as well--under compensation arrangements, moreover, that
commonly reward physicians for doing less for patients and penalize them for doing more. To what extent do
those financial arrangements undermine the fiduciary role of physicians? How are physicians to act in their
patients' best interests without compromising their own? Behind these questions lie broader ones of who
should decide what care is not worth the cost, and what criteria should be used for those decisions (Hall 1997).
Textbook economics and standard contract law say that consumers of health care answer these broader
questions when they make the insurance decision. That is fair enough in the abstract. But it is flawed as a
practical matter. In a regime of employment-based health insurance, many consumers have all too little choice.
They are, moreover, at an enormous information disadvantage not only as patients but as buyers of health
insurance. 
Physicians traditionally have played a fiduciary role precisely because of the information disparity. But that
responsibility--if not threatened by managed care--has been greatly changed by it. Physicians have become
agents of the health plans that employ them as well as fiduciaries of their patients, a highly conflicted role at
best. 
An increasingly complex health care marketplace suggests an increased role for government to protect
consumers. Government should not do so, however, by micro-managing that marketplace, as it has, forexample, by stipulating hospital length of stay after childbirth. It is, rather, the fundamental issues that need
attention: in particular, the financial incentives physicians work under and the restrictions on their
communications with patients about care options that are not reimbursed under a health plan. Health plans also
must be held fully accountable for decisions to withhold care, which they can often escape under current law. 
I. Features of the new model
Fee-for-service medicine, in concert with widespread health insurance that levied little direct cost on patients,
was inherently inflationary. Indemnity insurance inevitably gave rise to agency problems, as neither the
physician who ordered care nor the patient who received it internalized the cost (Latham 1996). Insurers were
reluctant to challenge decisions made by physicians, and so were employers. As a result, physicians effectively
controlled both the demand and the supply sides of the market. They acted as fiduciaries on behalf of patients
with little, if any, constraint on their professional autonomy--or, for the most part, on their fees.
Medical care was rationed, to be sure. Those without insurance (mainly the working poor) had to rely on the
informal safety net provided by charity care at private hospitals or on public hospitals. For them, it was often
Òtoo little, too lateÓ medicine. And ÒcommodityÓ rationing--applicable, for example, in the intensive care unit
and on the battlefield--prevailed as well. All the same, most insured Americans, including the elderly with the
advent of Medicare in the 1960s, had unencumbered access to virtually all the medical care money could buy,
and at little direct cost. 
This model worked reasonably well in the United States for several decades after World War II. But it began
to break down in the early 1980s after advances in technology had spurred health care costs at a previously
unheard-of rate. Extraordinarily expensive interventions--ranging from hip replacements to organ
transplants--became commonplace. And so did CT scans, MRIs, and other costly diagnostic tools. It was only
then that all the medical care money could buy became prohibitively expensive.
In the managed care model that emerged in reaction to the surge in costs, physicians have a dual role. They still
must act as fiduciaries for patients--a responsibility flowing out of the disparity between the knowledge of the
physician and of the typical patient. But they also assume some responsibility for the financial well-being of
the managed care organization that employs them. They are required to practice cost-effective medicine under
formal guidelines or protocols as to exactly what is to be done in each case. The distinguishing feature is
control by insurance companies of health care choices traditionally made within the patient-physician
relationship (Rodwin 1995). 
The rationing is thus ÒfiscalÓ as well as commodity in character. The physician becomes a guardian of
society's resources as well as fiduciary for the patient. The shift is from an ethic of Òuse it if it might helpÓ to
one of Òdon't use it unless it clearly willÓ (Morreim 1991).
Financial incentives, which include penalties as well as bonuses, enforce that guardian role. And so does
selective contracting with physicians, hospitals, and other providers, which has made it possible for managed
care organizations to drive down costs down or keep them from rising as they otherwise might. 
Trend to a network model
HMOs have moved away from the staff model (in which physicians are salaried, and the health plan, like
Kaiser Permanente, is nonprofit) to a network model (in which the physicians remain independent contractors
or work in a group practice, and the health plan is investor-owned). The trend also has been to "capitation"--to
the payment of a set amount for every enrolled patient.
The payments are set so that the network physician (usually a primary care physician rather than a specialist)
can meet the expected medical needs of the enrollees, using the norms of the health plan for cost-effective
medicine. The physicians can be at financial risk, however, for unusually sick enrollees or for a practice pattern
viewed as more costly than the norm. Similarly, unexpectedly low expenses on patient care add to physicians'
income. The incentives include bonuses, "withholds" (which are distributed, say, at the end of the year if the
plan comes in below budget), and "subcapitation" (which is to cover specialist and other outside services, andwhich are also distributed at the end of the year if expenses come in below budget). 
Fee-for-service payment, discounted for the HMO, is also used, although mainly for services by specialists.
Here, the health plan seeks to control costs through its market power to set fees as well as through its
practice-management techniques.
Perhaps an even more powerful incentive to physicians to adhere to the health plan's guidelines is the risk of
being dropped from its network. In local and regional areas where only a few HMOs dominate, they, no longer
the physicians, effectively control both the supply and the demand sides of the market. 
Hospitals have mobilized to counter the growing market power of HMOs by buying physician practices, and
thus linking the fortunes of the physicians with the hospitals rather than with the health plans. As of now,
however, almost all U.S. physicians work under contract with one or more managed-care health plan.
According to the American Medical Association, 92 percent of physicians in 1997 were in a practice that had
contracts with one or more managed care company.2 An estimated one-third of them had at least one capitated
contract as of 1996, as compared with one-fourth in 1994 (Miller 1996). And, if withholds are included in the
count, as many as half of all physicians were at some financial risk in 1994, based on a poll taken by the
Physician Payment Review Commission (Latham 1996). 
Large organizations have come to dominate the market. Of almost 600 HMOs in this country, fewer than 50 of
them are responsible for the health care of almost 90 percent of the enrollees (Fletcher and Engelhard 1995).
New players
Another distinguishing feature of the new model is that a whole new set of actors, besides the once highly
autonomous physician, become important in medical decision-making. The writers of the protocols, who all but
determine what physicians may do under the rubric of cost-effective care, play a important role. And so do
those who interpret the protocols, and decide, for example, whether a patient can see a specialist or take a
particular diagnostic test.
Stepped-down professionalization is also the rule. The primary care physician frequently replaces the
ordinarily more expensive specialist. The nurse or the technician performs tasks a primary care physician
commonly did in the past. Case managers, who are often nurses, typically determine when a chronically ill
patient will be discharged from the hospital by ruling on whether the health plan will reimburse an additional
day of stay.
Employers themselves have assumed complex new management responsibilities under managed care
(Moskowitz and Nassef 1997). Once passive bill payers, they now are active participants in deciding what
health plans will reimburse. And they have become an essential part of the appeals process when care is denied.
How are such appeals to be heard? Are they to be reviewed only on their medical merits? Or should, for
example, a bone-marrow transplant for the child, or for the spouse, of an especially valuable employee, which
was denied by health plan officials, be looked at against the broader interest of the firm? Even just a few years
ago, issues of this kind would have been considered the inviolable business of patients and their physicians.
Fixed budgets, but not a closed system 
The underlying principle of managed care is that allocating medical care must have a social as well as individual
context, as it does elsewhere in the industrial world where costs are constrained by fixed budgets. U.S.-style
managed care, however, is hardly a "closed" system, responsible for bringing a given pool of resources to a
collection of patients, as the British national and the Canadian provincial health systems are often described as
being. If one patient in those systems does not have the opportunity to have, say, elective surgery, because the
costs loom large relative to the expected benefits, the resources will be used elsewhere in the group. The aim is
a larger fairness--something that makes it easier to say "no" to British and Canadian patients than to their
American cousins (Menzel 1990). If nothing else, those patients have the consolation that someone else in need
in the group will gain from their loss. An American HMO is closed in the sense that premiums are exceedingly difficult to raise. But it is hardly
closed in the social sense, especially with the trend to investor-owned HMOs. The opportunity cost of a
medical procedure is not kept internal to the system. The savings benefit not just other health plan subscribers
in the form of lower premiums or other health care services, but also stockholders and top management in the
form of compensation, in more than a few cases, well into the seven-figure bracket. Strikingly, the founder of
U.S. Healthcare received over $900 million in cash and stock when the company was sold to Aetna in 1996.3
In this key respect, today's HMOs are unlike the prepaid medical plans organized by labor unions and
employers like Kaiser in the 1940s and 1950s. Those nonprofit plans were closed systems, designed for the
benefit only of those in the care group.
II. Potential ethical problems
What made fee-for-service medicine inherently inflationary was its incentives to overtreat patients. ÒUse it if it
might helpÓ coincided with--indeed promoted--physicians' own economic interests. And it stimulated advances
in medical technology, which in turn benefited physicians financially as well as patients medically. 
The incentives in managed care pose the opposite danger of undertreatment. Every decision taken in a
for-profit HMO to forgo an expensive diagnostic test--because it promises little, even if some, benefit--goes
directly to the bottom line, if not of the organization itself then of its contract physicians through incentive
payments. And, yet, every such decision poses some, even if small, health risk to the patient. It thus sets up an
inevitable conflict between the financial health of the organization or the physician and the physician's
traditional fiduciary duty to the patient. 
The theory is that such conflict can be resolved by the quality control mechanisms of the HMO, plus its
appeals process. But it takes a willingness on the part of the physician to make a case for care outside the
protocol, or on the part of the patient to appeal a denial of possibly beneficial care to health plan management. 
The hurdles in both cases loom large. The penalty of being dropped from the network if physicians go outside
health plan guidelines in the best interest of their patients has become ever larger as HMO medicine has
become increasingly concentrated. Moreover, the practice patterns of decentralized network HMOs are difficult
for centralized quality control mechanisms to monitor (Povar and Moreno 1988). Patients rarely are in a
position to challenge care decisions made by a health plan, especially if they do so without their physician's
support. 
Undertreatment is not a risk in a hospital-owned physician practice. To the contrary, linking the economic
well-being of the physician and of the hospital evokes the old fee-for-service model, with its potential for
overtreatment. But such linkage tends to foster a two-tiered health care system. The incentive is to keep
privately insured patients in a costly hospital setting. But it is also to restrict the length of stay of Medicare
patients, whose bills under federal regulation are fixed in advance on the basis of their diagnosis when admitted
(Rodwin 1993). In most states, these same constraints on hospital bills and thus on length of stay apply to
Medicaid patients as well.
Concerns about capitation
Capitation is a way for the insurer to share financial risk with the physician. It relieves the insurer from
intervening directly in medical decision-making as a means of cost-control (Miller 1996). And, albeit within a
fixed budget, it thus restores some of the clinical autonomy physicians had lost. Capitation, however, adds to
the dilemma physicians face as double agents. Besides the risk of being delisted, they face day-to-day conflict
between the needs of patients and their own need to make a living. 
Capitation was designed to force physicians into the cost-conscious practice of medicine, because it put their
own economic interests in such practice at stake. But that is also why it is ethically dubious. It pits the interests
of physicians directly against those of patients, making physicians not just double, but triple, agents. It
compromises the ability of physicians to offer disinterested advice (Rodwin 1993). Worst of all, unless the
capitated payments are adjusted for the medical needs of patients, or cover groups of patients large enough so
that the costs of caring for those patients are easily subsumed in a large aggregate, they act as an incentive toavoid enrolling and caring for the sickest patients. 
Capitation is especially problematic when the cost of diagnostic tests, specialists' fees, or hospital stays in
excess of the norms of the health plan must be carved out of the set payments paid to primary care physicians.
As "gatekeepers," HMO physicians have a hopelessly conflicted role. Gatekeeping may be a role natural to
modern medicine, with its many specialties and sub-specialties. But it becomes hopelessly conflicted when
undertreatment can be rewarded.
Medical ethics traditionally has required physicians to provide all necessary care to their patients, irrespective
of cost. Now, however, a growing body of physicians is being compensated under arrangements that conflict
with rather than, as in the past, foster that professional ideal (Latham 1996). The ideal, to be sure, is ingrained.
But, with ever larger financial incentives coming into play, even deeply held values can easily get compromised.
Honest discourse 
When care that could prove to be beneficial is denied, HMO subscribers may want to purchase it on their own.
In that case, health plan physicians are obliged to lay out the costs and benefits of the nonreimbursed care--that
is, to continue to act as agent of the patient even if not also as agent of the HMO that denied the care. What if,
however, the patients could not possibly afford to pay for the denied care on their own? Of what value is it to
educate them about a possibly beneficial course of testing or treatment that is beyond their financial reach? 
When nonreimbursed care is an option, the risk is that HMO physicians will downplay its merits. The risk is
especially large when patients lack financial resources, but it is not confined to them. Many other patients will
opt to appeal a denial of care, putting the physician in the middle of an often painful process.
To discourage appeals, health plans often encourage physicians to downplay the potential of nonreimbursed
care to be medically useful. Many states have outlawed Ògag rules,Ó which limit physicians in educating
patients about medical care choices beyond those a health plan is willing to reimburse. But, with patients at an
enormous information disadvantage vis-à-vis physicians, compliance has been difficult to enforce. 
Managed care organizations routinely include gag clauses in employment contracts (Martin and Bjerknes
1996). These may be under the guise of a requirement that a physician not undermine the confidence of the
subscriber in the health plan--the standard nondisparagement clause. Or they may be phrased as noncompete
or confidentiality clauses. The effect is the same: to inhibit physicians, with implicit threat of termination, from
fully informing patients about treatment options outside the plan. The Congressional Budget Office (1997) has
found that two-thirds of the 529 HMOs it canvassed used contracts that because of such clauses could be
interpreted as limiting communication about treatment options.
Gag rules not only discourage appeals, they also undermine informed consent--a patient right of autonomy to
be informed about treatment options that has been integral to the practice of medicine in the United States for
decades. However disguised, they turn back the clock to a "Doctor knows best" era when patients had little
access to information about their conditions and little control over what physicians did on their behalf.
Gag rules also promote Ògaming.Ó Blocked from pursuing treatment they believe is indicated, and even from
honest communication with patients about alternatives outside the health plan, physicians will be tempted to
exaggerate to health plan management the consequences of not following what they prescribe, or otherwise
shade the truth, in the interest of getting care for their patients they otherwise would have to forgo. That may be
all to the good in individual cases. But the merit of a medical care system that can so easily give rise to a culture
of dishonesty to ensure that patients needs are met is questionable. 
ERISA preemption
HMOs can be sued for malpractice when their contract or staff physicians make serious medical mistakes. And
HMO physicians remain personally liable for malpractice. They may well be more exposed to law suits than
those in independent practice because of reduced scope to pursue what are seen as marginally beneficial
procedures. It is difficult, however, to hold health plans legally accountable for decisions to limit care that ultimately cause
grave harm if they are acting on behalf of self-insured employers--a powerful protection since the vast majority
of Americans are covered under self-insured employer plans. An injured person can recovery the dollar value
of the benefit that was denied, but often nothing more. Albeit not all, the courts have tended to find no cause for
action against self-insured plans, as they have interpreted a denial of care or a particular modality of care that
has caused harm as a benefit determination under the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA). Drafters of the law had not intended that it exempt HMOs or others from institutional negligence--a
concern not even on the horizon in the early 1970s when fee-for-service was the dominant model. The object
was to allow large employers to reap the full benefit of cost-conscious medical care, using their sophistication
as purchasers and their clout in the marketplace (Zelman 1996). The incentive for them to do so included
exemption from state regulation of benefits and state taxation of insurance, which was growing rapidly at the
time. 
While not the intent, the ERISA preemption has afforded health plans a remarkable degree of protection
against compensatory damages. While an HMO would be liable when one of its surgeons makes a serious
medical mistake (e.g., leaves a sponge in the stomach of a patient after an operation), it would not have to fear a
lawsuit when a patient suffers comparably grave harm after a utilization review nurse rules, say, that an
inexpensive diagnostic test is called for rather than an expensive, but generally more reliable, one.
The courts that have found health plans not liable for errant care decisions, in effect, have been unwilling to
view the plans as sharing the moral agent role with physicians. And, yet, the plans adopt the protocols, rule on
whether patient care is in line with those protocols, and act as quality control managers. They cannot
reasonably claim, as they could in the old fee-for-service model, that they are but the pay-masters of employers,
responsible only for ensuring that contract terms are met. 
Nor can they claim that they are simply pursuing a care regime about which there can be no question. To the
contrary, the protocols governing decisions to provide care in one way rather than another, or to deny care, are
not the product of a consensus within the medical profession. They are but guidelines--devised by for-profit
companies themselves and unilaterally imposed on physicians (Reinhardt 1996). In application, the guidelines
may well miss some of the most important elements in real-time clinical situations. They can easily miss, for
example, the special needs of the elderly, the severity of an illness, and the complexities of interacting diseases.
They also become dated very quickly. 
Freedom and choice in the insurance decision
Many analysts stress that the key decisions about health care are made when people purchase health insurance
(Havighurst 1995). The choice of a lean health plan, the argument is, is also a choice to spend on other things.
The relevant question is not whether someone who comes down with a dread disease wants to "pull out all the
stops" (Hall 1997). Rather, it is whether "a cross-section of the healthy would pay their share of such efforts to
provide for the unlikely event of personally being in the same situation (Hall 1997)." The conflict is not
between a patient and society, but between two equally rational preferences of an individual, only in different
circumstances. Willingness to pay drops to zero when the risks become infinitesimally small (Menzel 1990). 
Emphasizing choice at the level of insurance, however, glosses over the limits of the choices many people have.
Employees ultimately pay for their own health insurance by forgoing other compensation. But it is their
employers who design the benefit packages--a by-product of the tax exclusion enjoyed by employment-based
health insurance (Cadette 1997).4
Even when employees can choose between a traditional indemnity health plan and an HMO, few are in a
position to know the full implications of that choice. In choosing the HMO, they consent to medicine that,
relative to what they knew in the past, is constrained in the use of resources and that affords their physicians
less scope to advance their interests. They consent to care limited to what health plans officials, rather than their
physicians, view as worth the cost--forgoing care that falls outside that boundary. 
What that means in practice is almost impossible for them to know. Even if insurance policies could be writtento describe the care to be provided in given circumstances, they would not be understood. Indeed,
understanding does not seem to be the aim at all, judging by the jargon and the caveats that characterize them. It
is fair to ask: Can people be held to contracts entered into without freedom or understanding? Surely society's
answer is ÒnoÓ when it comes to the care of the newborn. Resource limits get pushed out very far, precisely
because there was no free choice (Menzel 1990).
Emphasizing choice at the level of insurance may be perfectly reasonable if what is at issue is a contract
between parties with similar information, which is the fundamental premise of business ethics. When the
relationship must depend on trust--because parity of information is impossible to attain--business ethics cannot
govern. When adjudicating health insurance contract disputes, U.S. courts generally have rejected the
traditional presumption of parity of information built into contract law. They have, instead, interpreted those
contracts according to what the beneficiary might reasonably have expected, or should be entitled to expect,
rather than the actual terms of the contract (Morreim 1995). The theory has been that justice hinges on
enforcing contracts people can both choose and understand (Morreim 1995). 
Hall (1997) has argued that HMO subscribers agree to restrict their right to informed consent to major invasive
treatments when they make the insurance decision itself. The theory is that, except in those circumstances,
people cede informed consent to the HMO director and their primary care physician as part of a broader
bargain to buy cost-conscious health care. They agree in advance to a bundle of unspecified refusals of
marginally beneficial care (and, in addition, to being told about the refusals)--just as they agree to being
subjected to a regime of blood pressure and temperature checks and similar small routines when hospitalized.
Some people will be prepared to strike the bargain Hall proposes. Others, however, will regard it as Faustian.
Much like a gag rule, ceding informed consent to an HMO or a physician, even if only for care considered
routine, would mean a reversion to the paternalism of the past. It would vest a trust in protocols that may be
warranted in most circumstances but not in all. And it would require confidence in the HMO's ability to
suspend short-term Òbottom lineÓ thinking in care decisions. 
III. Regulatory response
As public concern with managed care has grown, the response of policymakers at both the state and the federal
levels has been to second-guess the protocols, and often override them by regulation or statute. Not
surprisingly, the intervention at both the federal and the state level has been on matters that have captured
headline attention: 24-hour hospital stays after routine childbirth, out-patient mastectomies, and other practices
that strike much of the public as bizarre. 
Regulatory interventions of that kind may be useful if they remind health plan officials (and ultimately the
employers who shape the benefit packages) of the dangers of carrying the economical practice of medicine to
extremes. But they put government in a micro-management role it cannot hope to perform well. And they may
well encourage the kind of "cookbook" medicine that critics of managed care accuse it of providing. These
interventions are, moreover, regulation around the edges of the problem. Government might better focus on
building a regulatory framework that would deal with more fundamental issues: financial incentives, disclosure,
and professionalization, important among them.
Capitation may be an efficient way of forcing physicians to practice cost-effective medicine. The challenge for
regulators, however, is to retain the power of the economic incentive, but to separate it from the welfare of
individual patients. This could be done by limiting the extent to which a physician's total income that is at risk;
by spreading the risk across large numbers of health plan participants and physicians; and by calculating the
incentive payments less, rather than more, frequently. The object would be to weaken what otherwise might be a
close connection between individual clinical decisions and physicians' incomes.
Limiting the income subject to risk is the approach the Health Care Financing Administration has taken in
ruling that stop-loss insurance is required if the percentage of income at risk, for an individual physician or for
a group, exceeds 25 percent.
Limiting the income subject to risk for an individual physician or a relatively small group of them, however,provides little protection to patients. It spreads the income risk over too few of them to be much of a defense
against undertreatment. In particular, as Latham (1996) has pointed out, it would be of little value to potentially
high-cost patients who needed to seek medical care at the end of the contract period when significant amounts
of money in the form of incentive payments--even if far short of 25 percent of income--were riding on the kind
of care they were given. Unexpected expenses from only a few patients need not be all that large even to upset
a budget that is on track as the end of the contract period nears. What matters most from the patient's point of
view is how much money is at stake in his or her own treatment--a consideration that current regulation built
around a 25 percent figure fails to recognize adequately in many cases.
Limiting the income subject to risk makes more sense if applied across a large physician group--large enough
in any case to undermine the incentive to undertreat. The theory is that one physician's unexpectedly high costs
in a given contract period will balance out another's unusually low costs--making it possible for all to earn the
incentive payments without having to compromise clinical judgments. 
It would also make sense for regulators to oblige health plans to calculate incentives infrequently. That too
would separate the incentive from the care decision of individual patients. High-cost patients would pose a
smaller threat to physician income if their expenses were averaged in the cost data for a whole year, say, rather
than for only a month or a quarter. Unusually large expenses for a given patient would be far less threatening
to an annual budget than to a monthly or quarterly one.
Need for transparency 
Most current regulation governing physician conflict of interest was written when fee-for-service medicine was
the dominant model. It thus characteristically prohibits arrangements (such as tie-ins to physician-owned
laboratories and other outside facilities) under which physicians benefit from providing, not from withholding,
care (Martin and Byerknes 1996). Regulation needs to be keyed to today's reality, not yesterday's.
Health plans ought to be required to disclose--in plain language--the financial incentives under which their
contract or salaried physicians work. That, to be sure, would not further trust. But the lack of trust lies not with
transparency about the financial incentives, but with the incentives themselves. The fear that disclosure will
undermine trust says a lot about the incentives and the decisions taken because of them. Physicians should not
work under financial arrangements they would be unwilling to disclose to patients (Hall 1997).
Health plans should also be obliged to disclose just how they practice cost-conscious medicine. Granted, it is
impossible to describe how they would respond to every contingency. But it is not impossible to provide
reasonably complete information on such things as the utilization review process, the criteria used for denial of
care, and the recourse patients have when denied. Honest discussion of the plan's methods for meeting the
medical needs of its subscribers at relatively low cost would be of greater benefit to subscribers than the hype
that now characterizes the marketing of many HMOs.
Moreover, every means of striking gag clauses from physician contracts ought to be pursued (Martin and
Byerknes 1996). Federal legislation to that end (H.R. 2976, The Patient Right to Know Act), which was
introduced in 1996 by Representatives Greg Ganske (R-Ind.) and Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), received
widespread bipartisan support. The draft legislation, which would bar a health plan from restricting
communication between patient and physician, was defeated, however, on grounds that it would raise health
care costs--an implicit recognition that gag rules, in fact, restrain costs. Treatment denials should be truthfully
disclosed, as the proposed legislation would require. And they should be disclosed even if such disclosure
would have the effect of making denials difficult to enforce, the reason why gag rules help contain health care
costs. Forthright denials surely trespass less on the physician's obligation as a fiduciary than does
complicitous silence. Patients may have agreed to cost-effective health care when they made the insurance
decision. But, because their knowledge of what that might mean in practice is necessarily limited, they did not
agree in advance to remaining ignorant of their options outside the plan. 
Roles for purchasing cooperatives
Disclosure requirements may not provide adequate consumer protection, however. One promising possibilitywould be to resurrect the idea of Òpurchasing cooperativesÓ (a concept akin to the Òhealth alliancesÓ of the
Clinton health plan). At a minimum, the cooperatives would make available to consumers objective comparative
information on health plans and their style of practice, thus mimicking the benefits office of any well-run U.S.
corporation of size.
Regularly published data on such things as the rate of legitimate complaints from subscribers, the percentage
of subscribers who disenrolled, and physician turnover would be of value not only to consumers but also to
small employers unable to staff a benefits office. The model might be the Pacific Business Group on Health, a
coalition of large employers (located mainly in Northern California ) that collects health plan performance data
and disseminates them to participating employers and their employees. 
A better informed public would push the managed care marketplace in the direction of competition on the basis
of quality and price rather than marketing. Even if the cooperatives did little more than disseminate information
on the Òmedical loss ratiosÓ of plans (the percentage of revenue spent on direct patient care), they would be of
value. These ratios averaged 82.0 percent at for-profit plans in 1995; 86.5 percent at nonprofit plans (HCIA
1997). While many factors could account for the difference, the pressure to produce earnings to support share
prices, which is of little, if any, direct benefit to subscribers, is surely important among them. 
Purchasing cooperatives would also bring the benefits of pooling to the health insurance market faced by
relatively small employers. And they could be an instrument for prodding the market in the direction of largely
uniform plans. Having to choose among a relatively small number of plans would enhance rather than restrict
choice, as it would reduce the complexity consumers now face in making a choice. Largely uniform plans
whose features become well known would also increase consumer confidence that needed care will not be
unfairly denied or otherwise compromised on cost grounds. Standardization, moreover, would also reduce the
cost of contract administration, and thus channel proportionately more resources to direct patient care.
The role of the cooperatives could be broadened to include an appeals mechanism. The object would be
independent appraisal of whether denials of care, for example, were in line with the stated practice of a health
plan. Third-party objectivity would help to reduce the volume of malpractice litigation as well as level the
playing field between subscribers and health plans. 
Third-party appeals mechanisms would also foster cost-effective medicine. HMOs thrive financially by taking
an aggressive stance on whether a particular benefit is covered under a health insurance contract. They can do
so because of the gray areas, if not outright uncertainty, medicine must deal with, especially in a high-tech age.
But this creates costs that ripple throughout the health care system: in claims disputes, in the financing of
unpaid hospital receivables, and other overhead--all of which would diminish when contract disputes could be
settled promptly with third-party rulings. 
Reasserting clinical criteria
Regulators also need to ask some basic questions about what constitutes the practice of medicine. Reduced
professionalization does not necessarily raise credentialing issues. But the same cannot be said of utilization
review by nonphysicians. 
One approach would be for regulators to insist that utilization review be the province of physicians--in effect, to
declare it the practice of medicine (Gray 1991). That would restore a measure of autonomy that physicians lost
in the shift to managed care. And it would tip the power balance away from business, and toward medical,
criteria in care decisions. 
An alternative approach, which has been put forth by the American Medical Association, would be to require
managed care organizations to establish a medical staff structure similar to that at hospitals (AMA Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs 1995). This also would put utilization review back in the hands of physicians, as
they would have to sign their names to any patient care decision of any importance. 
Consideration also ought to be given to amending ERISA to ensure that health plans can be held liable when
decisions adopted for cost reasons turn out to do grave harm. In combining the financing and delivery of healthcare, HMOs cannot claim that all they do is implement the benefit decisions of employers. If only because they
can deny care, they are active in the delivery of care, and are thus fiduciaries in their own right. Like physicians,
the health plans touch the traditional sphere of medical ethics in decisions to provide or withhold care or
provide it one way rather than another. As ordinary business enterprises, however, they have no moral
obligation other than the square-dealing required by business ethics. Regulation is needed to hold the health
plans accountable for both sets of obligations.
ERISA, moreover, creates an uneven playing field in its overriding of state mandates for self-insured plans. It is
doubtful that the quality of medical care in this country has been adversely affected by the override. For sure,
however, mandates designed in the lobbying corridors of the statehouse, which have shaped the kind of
insurance everyone else has been forced to buy, have added to health care costs. As a result, other, possibly
more beneficial, services have not been included in the fixed budgets that health plans have had to work with.
ERISA should be amended not only to make health plans accountable, but also to become a vehicle for a
broader exemption from state mandates. That would be at little, if any, potential cost to health care quality and,
quite possibly, large potential benefit.
Yet another reason for amending ERISA is that it impedes efforts by the states to enact health care reform, this
again by its blocking their application to self-insured plans. Perhaps most important in an age of managed care,
states are hampered in funding care for the indigent through insurance pools because they cannot tax
self-insured funds (Farrell 1997). 
This is especially important because care for the indigent is much harder to finance than it was in the past. To
be sure, HMO medicine has made health insurance more affordable for millions of Americans who would have
had to forgo health insurance had the cost trend of the past continued. But the economies that managed care
has forced on private hospitals have squeezed their charity budgets, pushing patients who are unable to pay in
ever greater number into underfunded, and often inadequate, public hospitals.
Enacted long before the advent of the trend to managed care, ERISA is overdue for reexamination in the light
of then unanticipated institutional change. The express preemption of state law-making authority creates a
legislative void. The states may not act, and Washington, relying on a statute whose relevance is now
questionable, has not acted. The void has been filled by the courts, but the resulting judge-made law, without a
legislative framework, is piecemeal and inconsistent (Farrell 1997). 
New variant of staff-model HMO
The market itself is taking steps to shift the power balance back to physicians, creating in the process a modern
variant of the staff-model HMO. That is the message of the rise of Òprovider sponsored networks" (PSNs),
which are effectively HMOs but with roots in medicine rather than insurance. 
Their core quality is their capacity to assume responsibility for a continuum of medical care (Zelman 1996).
Their assets are concentrated in the actual delivery of care (hence the similarity to the staff-model HMO of
old), whereas the assets of the typical network-model HMO are largely in its administrative capacity (Hirshfeld
1996).
Ironically, PSNs--whether made up of physicians only or, as is increasingly the case, linked to hospitals and
other care givers in a Òintegrated delivery networkÓ--have emerged in reaction to the trend to capitation in the
network-model HMO. If physicians are to assume significant financial risk for such things as the services of
specialists and even the hospitalization of their patients, they may as well take on the full insurance function
themselves. That way, they not only regain more lost autonomy, they cut out third-party administrative expense.
If the network is nonprofit, the system is closed, an added advantage from an ethical perspective. Any savings
would be held within the care group--if not in the form of medical care, then in the form of lower premiums.
Significant savings can flow from integration--especially by cutting out the overlapping costs incurred when
patients are moved between hospital and nursing home or rehabilitation facility. Integration of these and other
care settings, by reducing redundant procedures and red tape, would make for a more humane as well as moreefficient health care system.
The federal government was instrumental in promoting PSNs in last year's Balanced Budget Act when it
offered Medicare beneficiaries the option to select a PSN among a wider choice of health plan than
beneficiaries had available to them in the past. As part of the legislation, PSNs were given the opportunity to
meet new federal solvency standards, rather than state standards which vary greatly and thus often blocked the
development of PSNs. In most states, only the largest and most sophisticated of physician practices, which
were typically linked to hospitals, were in a position to be state-licensed as a health plan. 
The broader issue for federal regulation is whether solvency standards for PSNs are all that important after all.
Because of ERISA, more and more employers have found it cost-effective to self-insure (as they avoid state
mandates and state insurance taxes). But they may underwrite only the fee-for-service and PPO plans that their
employees select. For HMO coverage, they have remained dependent for the most part on insurance carriers.
They are unable to contract directly with providers because of state solvency standards and other licensing
requirements for underwriting. Those standards are of major concern to people who purchase health insurance
as individuals and as small employers. But they are a distinctly secondary consideration to a General Motors
or to Corporate America generally. It also makes a major difference to solvency standards that the assets of
PSNs are in health care delivery itself, not merely in administrative substructure. 
Allowing employers to contract directly with PSNs would be a major step forward. Just as before, the
employers could count on relatively fixed costs for health care--in this case, what in effect would be a global
capitation payment. But their employees would have the benefit of health care decisions influenced more by
strictly clinical considerations. Both would benefit from eliminating the "middleman," and using the savings to
lower health care costs or otherwise stretch a fixed health care dollar to added services.
A key question is just how much financial risk PSNs assume, and thus how much they should be regulated
like insurance companies. 
One option would be to regulate PSNs as insurance companies, but not for services that they perform
themselves. The theory is that they do not assume insurance risk for such services--only routine business risk,
which does not threaten their capacity to deliver what was promised. Under this option, capital requirements
would be risk-based. A PSN would be required to hold capital commensurate with its exposure to insurance
risk, which would become quite small as PSNs grow in size and scope.
Alternatively, PSNs could be required to carry re-insurance, which would transfer risk back to the insurance
market. There could be a role for the federal government to pioneer such insurance if the private marketplace is
timid to establish it.
Ultimately, the problem with prepaid medicine is that risk-bearers must have significant control over allocation
decisions. They must be in a position to price risk and manage it. But that thrusts insurance carriers into health
care roles for which they are not well-suited. For managed care to avoid its inherent ethical problems, much if
not all of the risk of financial failure has to be put on those who properly make care decisions.
IV. Second-stage challenge
Further spread of managed care is almost a certainty in a background of ongoing advances in costly medical
technology. Despite the misgivings of many physicians and of an apparently growing part of the public at
large, the payers see themselves as without good alternatives. Employers can be counted on to continue to keep
a lid on benefit costs, even as technology pulls in the opposite direction. And the federal government is relying
on managed care as part of a long-range plan to rein in outlays for Medicare and Medicaid.
Managed care's ability to control health care costs will be tested as never before, however. It will be greatly
more difficult to keep health care costs under control now that much of the high-cost, low-benefit medical
practice of the past has been eliminated. And thus managed care can no longer generate rapidly rising earnings
and, at the same time, provide the quality health care Americans are apt to continue to demand. The real test of
managed care as an instrument for both cost-effectiveness and quality in medical care thus still lies ahead.While the slump last year in Oxford Health's stock price reflected company-specific problems, the challenge
managed care now faces also must have figured in the outcome. 
Renewed rise in HMO premiums for many employers is also troubling. The pressure for earnings imposed by
the marketplace is unrelenting. But, with the "low-hanging fruit" already picked, it is no longer easy to satisfy
investors without sacrificing the quality of health care or without raising its price. The danger that patient care
will be compromised is thus now especially high. The pressure for earnings has been there all along,
interacting with financial incentives that can be perverse. But that combination promises to pose even greater
threat to patient care now that the easy efficiency gains in health care have been made. 
In this background, it is especially important that consumers have an opportunity to exercise choice in their
health insurance; that they understand the consequences of cost-conscious choices, in particular; and that they
are fully apprised of the financial incentives under which their physicians work. It is also especially important
that health plans be held accountable, as they are often not under ERISA, and that consumers have an
opportunity to prevail in disputes with health plans when the merits of their case can be shown (Kinney 1996). 
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Notes 
  
1. Author's calculation based on Table B-3, Appendix B, The Annual Report of the Council of Economic
Advisers,  February 1998.   
2. Source: New York Times , March 25, 1998, page D1.  3. Source: Wall Street Journal , April 2, 1996, page
2.  
4. The tax exclusion is a major reason why U.S. health care costs are extraordinarily high--and thus a major
reason for the shift to managed care. Because of the exclusion, employees typically have more health insurancethan they otherwise would. The insurance protects against the financial consequences of a major unforeseen
illness, a reasonable use of insurance to spread risk. But it also pays for routine and predictable expenses that
otherwise would be paid out of after-tax income, an unreasonable use of insurance made reasonable only by
the exclusion. The arena over which moral hazard has held sway has thus been very broad. The exclusion
pushed health insurance in the direction of increasingly comprehensive benefits and then, as moral hazard
would have confidently predicted, overuse of those benefits as if "free." Fee-for-service medicine was able to
charge more than it otherwise could have, since the payments ultimately came out of pretax, not after-tax,
income (Cadette 1997). 